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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning December 31, 2007, the membership of the National 
Labor Relations Board (“the Board”) dropped to two members.1  Shortly 
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 1 David J. Murphy, The “New” Obama National Labor Relations Board: Attack, 
Retreat, or Both?, in EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 2009, at 267, 263-94 (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18618, 2009). 
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beforehand, with four members left, the Board delegated all of its power 
to a three-member panel.2  When the terms of two of the four remaining 
members expired shortly after, the Board was left with two members: 
Wilma Liebman, a Democrat, and Peter Schaumber, a Republican. 3 
Liebman and Schaumber continued to adjudicate cases, assuming that 
two members constituted a quorum of any panel of the Board; that is, 
Liebman and Schaumber constituted a quorum of the three-member 
panel to which the Board delegated its power.4 
For more than two years, the NLRB was comprised of only these 
two members.  This changed in March 2010, when President Barack 
Obama made recess-appointed Craig Becker and Mark Pearce to the 
Board, thus raising Board membership to four. 5   The Board, while 
comprised of two members, issued more than 500 decisions. 6  The 
validity of those decisions is at issue given Section 3(b) of the NLRA 
which requires that the Board have, “at all times,” a quorum of three.7 
Six circuits have addressed the issue.  The First, Second, Fourth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have held that the two-member Board 
constitutes a quorum of the three-member panel, even though the Board 
at the time of the decision lacked a quorum of three.8  On the other hand, 
the D.C. Circuit has held that the two-member Board is invalid because, 
when the Board lost its quorum, the Board could no longer function.9  
Due to the significance of the issue to labor disputes, the Supreme Court 
has granted certiorari in New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB.10 
                                                                                                             
 2 Kenneth Dolin, D.C. Circuit Says Two-Member NLRB Lacks Authority But the 
Recent Decision Differs with Three Other Appellate Courts that Addressed the Issue, 31 
NAT’L L.J. 12 (2009). 
 3 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
 4 See Dolin, supra note 2, at 12. 
 5 See White House Press Release, President Obama Announces Recess 
Appointments to Key Administration Positions (March 27, 2010), at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-obama-announces-recess-
appointments-key-administration-positions (last accessed May 4, 2010). 
 6 Wilma Liebman, NLRB Press Release (February 5, 2010), 
http://www.nlrb.gov/shared_files/Press%20Releases/2010/R-2725.pdf (last accessed May 
4, 2010) (noting that the two-member Board has issued more than 500 cases). 
 
 7 29 U.S.C. Section 153(b) (2009). 
 8 See generally, Northeastern Land Services, LTD v. NRLB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 
2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009); and New Process 
Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 9 Laurel Baye Healthcare v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469. 
 10 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted 130 S. Ct. 488 (2009). 
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This article argues that the decisions of a two-member Board are 
invalid, but that the decisions may be rehabilitated once the President 
nominates, and the Senate approves, additional members.  Part II 
describes the history of the Board and the NLRA as well as the current 
requirements of the Board.  Part III details the arguments of the differing 
circuits when addressing whether a two-member Board is valid.  Part IV 
analyzes arguments on either side of the issue and concludes that the 
statutory integrity of the NLRA should be upheld despite the 
inconvenience of invalidating more than 300 cases. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Wagner Act and the Self-Enforcing NLRB 
Unfair employment practices and a rise in unemployment during 
the Great Depression precipitated a fight for fair employment and the 
rights of employees.  In response, Congress made several innovative, but 
unsuccessful, attempts to protect employee rights.11  Finally, in 1935, 
Congress successfully enacted the Wagner Act.12  Through this statute, 
Senator Robert F. Wagner, the main proponent of the Act, sought to give 
workers power by joining them with their fellow workers.13  Although 
past statutes had also sought to unite workers, the Wagner Act 
safeguarded employees’ rights with more vigor than its forerunners.14 
The Wagner Act established an administrative three-member board 
appointed by the President.15  The members were to have staggered, five-
year terms.16  Unlike previous Boards, the Wagner Act provided the 
three-member Board with the means to enforce its decisions through 
subpoena powers, the ability to make findings of fact and issue cease-
and-desist orders, and the power to order affirmative remedies for 
violations of the Wagner Act.17  Furthermore, the Wagner Act supported 
these powers with the right to seek judicial enforcement of Board 
                                                                                                             
 11 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 5 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 12 TIMOTHY J. HEINSZ, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR LAW: 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 109 (6th ed. 2009). 
 13 Id. at 111. 
 14 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 10 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 15 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 451 (1935) (codified as 
amended at 29 U.S.C. 153 (2006)). 
 16 Id. 
 17 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 454–56 (1935) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. 160 (2006)). 
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orders.18   Such enforcement powers were lacking in previous boards 
established by labor statutes, and the presence of enforcement tools made 
the Wagner Act and the Board’s decisions harder for employers to 
ignore.19 
B. Problems with the Wagner Act 
Although its more conservative predecessors had fallen to 
constitutional attacks, the Wagner Act and its powerful new Board 
survived such constitutional criticism.20  Proponents of the Wagner Act 
and similar efforts argued that the Act was constitutional because 
“employer interference with the right of workers to organize into unions 
and the refusal of employers to bargain collectively led to labor 
disputes;”21 labor disputes, in turn, interfered with interstate commerce.22  
This time the argument succeeded.23 
Despite overcoming constitutional criticism, the Wagner Act could 
not withstand attacks from both employers and labor unions.24   The 
employers accused the Board of having a “pro-labor bias.”25  On the 
other hand, the tension between craft and industrial unions caused the 
unions to turn against the Board as well; the craft unions accused the 
Board of being pro-industrial unions, and the industrial unions attacked 
the Board for being pro-craft unions.26 
After World War II, antagonism for the Board grew when 
unemployment levels again skyrocketed. 27   Congress answered the 
unemployment crisis by freezing many collective bargaining agreements 
created during the war.28  In response, employees used tools provided by 
the Wagner Act to strike against their ineffective collective bargaining 
agreements.29  Consequently, by 1947, the public turned against unions, 
                                                                                                             
 18 Id. 
 19 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 10 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id.; NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 24 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 16 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
 27 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 19 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
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no longer viewing unions as the “underdog[s], but rather [viewing them] 
as having too much economic and political power.”30 
C. The Current NLRB 
Congress remedied the growing public animosity toward the NLRA 
by enacting the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. 31   The Taft-Hartley Act 
amendments brought about two dramatic changes in the structure and 
operation of the Board.  First, the amendments increased the number of 
Board members. Previously, the NLRB had been composed of three 
members.32  The 1947 amendments modified the NLRA to require five 
members.33  The appointment requirements, however, remained the same.  
The five members were, and still are, to be “appointed by the President 
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.”34  Although the Taft-
Hartley Act itself made no additional requirements of the Board 
members, it has been tradition that “no more than three Board Members 
are from the same political party.”35 
Second, the 1947 Amendments changed the “role” of the Board. 
Under the Wagner Act, the Board had performed the role of judge as 
well as prosecutor.36  To remedy the potential prejudice that could come 
from this dual role, the Taft-Hartley Act created a General Counsel to act 
as a prosecutor and supervisor of the NLRA.37  The General Counsel and 
the Board were to act separately in the discharge of their responsibilities, 
meaning that the Board no longer participated in the preliminary 
investigations of claims.38  To further increase efficiency, “the Board 
devised a system by which most of its cases could be decided by five 
                                                                                                             
 30 Id. 
 31 National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 49 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (2006)). 
 32 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 454–56 (1935) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. 160 (2006)); see also TIMOTHY J. HEINSZ, DENNIS R. NOLAN & 
RICHARD A. BALES, LABOR LAW: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN A FREE SOCIETY 150 (6th 
ed. 2009). 
 33 National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 49 Stat. 139 (1947) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–67 (2006)). 
 34 Id. 
 35 David J. Murphy, The “New” Obama National Labor Relations Board: Attack, 
Retreat, or Both?, in EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 2009, at 267, 263-94 (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18618, 2009). 
 36 National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 451–55 (1935) (codified 
as amended at 29 U.S.C. 160 (2006)). 
 37 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (2006); see also NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 22 (1995), 
available at http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
 38 NLRA, THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 26 (1995), available at 
http://www.nlrb.gov/publications/history/thhe_first_60_years.aspx. 
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panels of three members,” but the entire Board decided issues of 
unresolved policy or law.39 
In addition to these changes, the Taft-Hartley amendments also 
specified how a quorum of the Board was to be determined.  The 
amended Section 3(b) of the NLRA states that the Board may: 
delegate to any group of three or more members any 
or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . 
[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two 
members shall constitute a quorum of any group 
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.40 
These two sentences form the basis of the issue of whether a two-
member Board is permissible. 
D. The Two-Member Board 
Until recently, the Board has stayed true to the three-member panel 
system and issued decisions through three-member panels, except in rare 
circumstances.41  However, beginning in December 31, 2007, the Board 
has been constituted by only two members “both for political reasons and 
presumably President Bush’s general disregard for the NLRB . . . .”42 
On December 16, 2007, the Board lost its first of five members 
when Chairman Robert J. Battista’s term expired.43  The terms of two of 
the remaining four members, Peter Kirsanow and Dennis P. Walsh, were 
set to expire on December 31, 2007.44  With expiration of two out of four 
members’ terms looming and no hope of new Board nominees on the 
horizon, the remaining four members delegated their powers to a three-
member panel, effective December 28, 2007.45  Based on the Board’s 
own analysis and that of the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), the two 
remaining members concluded that the delegation to a three-member 
board would allow them to continue to issue decisions as long as the 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id.; see also National Labor Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, ch. 120, 49 Stat. 139 
(1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-67 (2006)). 
 40 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). 
 41 11 EMPLOYMENT COORDINATOR LABOR RELATIONS Board Members § 41:5 (2009). 
 42 David J. Murphy, The “New” Obama National Labor Relations Board: Attack, 
Retreat, or Both?, in EMPLOYMENT LITIGATION 2009, at 267, 263-94 (PLI Litig. & Admin. 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18618, 2009). 
 43 Kenneth Dolin, D.C. Circuit Says Two-Member NLRB Lacks Authority But the 
Recent Decision Differs with Three Other Appellate Courts that Addressed the Issue, 31 
NAT’L L.J. 12 (2009). 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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“two remaining members [were] . . . part of the three-member group to 
which the Board delegated all of its powers . . . .”46  When Kirsanow and 
Walsh’s terms expired on December 31, 2007, Chair Wilma Liebman 
(Democrat) and Peter Schaumber (Republican) were all that remained of 
the NLRB.47 
E. The OLC Opinion 
On May 16, 2002, the Board requested an opinion from the OLC on 
whether, having delegated all of its powers to a group of three 
members, the . . . Board may issue decisions and orders in unfair 
labor practice and representation cases once three of the five 
seats on the Board have become vacant.”48 The OLC issued its 
opinion on March 4, 2003, holding that a two-member Board is 
valid if the two members were “part of the three-member group 
to which delegated all of its powers and if they both participate in 
such decisions and orders.”49 
The OLC opinion notes that in the past, when Board membership 
has fallen to two members, the Board has ceased to issue decisions and 
orders.50  However, the OLC opinion suggests that this does not have to 
be the case, as long as the Board delegated all of its powers to a group of 
three members before the membership fell to two.51 
The OLC makes three arguments for validating a two member 
Board.  First, the Board argues that the plain text of the statute supports a 
valid two-member Board if the Board had delegated all of its powers to a 
group of three members, and the remaining two members were part of 
the group of three to which the Board delegated its powers.52  According 
to the OLC Opinion, the NLRA clearly provides that two members shall 
constitute a quorum where the Board has delegated its powers to a group 
of three or more members.53  Furthermore, the OLC contends that the 
statute ensures that a vacancy will not “impair the right of the remaining 
                                                                                                             
 46 M. Edward Whelan, III, Quorum Requirements: Memorandum Opinion for the 
Solicitor, Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 1 (Mar. 4, 2003), http:// 
www.usdoj.gov/olc/2003/nlrb_quorum_03042003.pdf (last visited Mar. 27, 2010). 
 47 Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 469, 471 (D.C. 
Cir. 2009). 
 48 Whelan, supra note 45. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). 
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members to exercise all of the powers of the Board.”54  This vacancy 
provision along with the two-member quorum provision provides “that 
the Board could form a ‘group’ that could exercise all of the Board’s 
powers as long as it had a quorum of two members.”55 
Second, the OLC opinion uses Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NRLB as 
precedent to determine that a two-member Board would be valid if it was 
part of a three-member panel to which the Board had delegated its 
powers.56 
Third, the OLC determines that the legislative history of the NLRA 
supports its conclusion.57  The intent of the Taft-Hartley Amendment was 
to “enable the Board to handle more cases by dividing itself into 
panels.”58  If the Board were to cease issuing orders, it would undermine 
the intent of the Taft-Hartley Act.59  On the other hand, allowing a two-
member Board to continue adjudication would sustain the Board and its 
work.  The OLC acknowledges that this intent is not exactly on point, but 
the conclusion that the two-member Board is valid would at least be 
consistent with the intent of the Taft-Hartley amendments.60 
Therefore, although the OLC realized that its decision was at odds 
with dicta in a D.C. Circuit case, Railroad Yardmasters of America v. 
Harris, the OLC decided that the plain text of the NLRA along with its 
legislative intent and some precedent permit the conclusion that “if the 
Board delegated all of its powers to a group of three members, that group 
could continue to issue decisions and orders as long as a quorum of two 
members remained.”61 
F. Quorums under a Five-Member Board 
Although Liebman and Schaumber continued to adjudicate based 
on the opinion of the OLC, recent petitioners have attempted to overturn 
the NLRB’s rulings based, not on the merits of their cases, but rather on 
the invalidity of the two-member panel.  The issue is one of first 
impression.  Previously, in Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, the Ninth Circuit 
held that, when the resignation of one panel member is effective on the 
day a decision is announced, the resignation did not invalidate the 
                                                                                                             
 54 Id. (emphasis added). 
 55 Whelan, supra note 45, at 2. 
 56 Id. (citing 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982)); see also discussion infra Part II.F. 
 57 Whelan, supra note 45, at 3. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 3–4; see infra Part IV.B for discussion of Yardmasters of America v. Harris, 
721 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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decision.62  Furthermore, in dicta, the Photo-Sonics court held that “a 
decision by two members of the panel would still be binding.”63 
The case involved three supervising personnel who ran Photo-
Sonics, a company manufacturing photographic equipment in California: 
President, John Kiel; burr bench supervisor, Robert Alonzo; and machine 
shop foreman, Richard Ominski.64  These supervising personnel became 
apprehensive when a union began an organizing campaign to unionize 
Photo-Sonics’ employees.65  The union conducted an election and lost, 
but the employees challenged approximately twenty ballots due to 
conduct of the supervising personnel.66  For example, employees claimed 
that Ominski and Alonzo both threatened to “make it rough” on the 
employees if a union was established at Photo-Sonics.67  Additionally, 
Kiel purportedly threatened to lay off people if a union were 
established.68  Furthermore, approximately two to three weeks before the 
election, Kiel held meetings attended by employees in which he 
allegedly promised to provide more holidays and better benefits for 
employees’ families to prove to the employees that they did not need a 
union.69  Finally, Marshall, one of the employees with whom Ominski 
had discussed the union, was fired for being “inefficient and too 
slow. . . .”70   The General Counsel claimed that these reasons were 
pretextual, and that Photo-Sonics had fired Marshall for his connection 
with the union.71  Photo-Sonics argued that its supervising personnel 
were not aware of Marshall’s union membership and, also, that its 
personnel had not made any of the alleged statements.72 
A three-member panel heard the case, and concluded that the 
supervising personnel had violated Section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA for the 
above reasons.73   But, before the decision was announced, one member 
of the panel resigned.74  The “resignation became effective at the first 
                                                                                                             
 62 Photo-Sonics, Inc. v. NLRB, 678 F.2d 121, 122 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 63 Id. at 122. 
 64 Photo-Sonics, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. 567, 571 (1981), enforced, 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 
1982). 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. at 579. 
 69 Id. 
 70 Photo-Sonics, Inc., 254 N.L.R.B. at 580, enforced, 678 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1982). 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 578–81. 
 73 Id. at 586. 
 74 Photo-Sonics, 678 F.2d at 122. 
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moment of January 14, 1981, [and therefore that member] . . . was not a 
member of the Board when the Board’s decision issued later that day.”75 
When Photo-Sonics realized the resignation became effective the 
day that the decision issued, Photo-Sonics appealed to the Ninth Circuit, 
arguing that the Board’s decision was invalid because it was not made by 
a three-member panel. 76   The Ninth Circuit found Photo-Sonics’s 
argument unpersuasive.77  The Ninth Circuit cited to the NLRA Section 
3(b), which states that the Board may 
delegate to any group of three or more members any 
or all of the powers which it may itself exercise. . . . 
[T]hree members of the Board shall, at all times, 
constitute a quorum of the Board, except that two 
members shall constitute a quorum of any group 
designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.78 
Although no court has defined “quorum” as used in the NLRA, the 
Ninth Circuit drew an analogy to cases interpreting the statutes which 
established the number of judges required to hear an appeal.79  Federal 
statutes require that a panel of three judges hear appeals; however, two 
judges may constitute a quorum of the panel of three.80  In this context, 
previous courts have defined “quorum” as the “number of the members 
of the court as may legally transact judicial business.”81  Therefore, two 
members of a three-judge panel may validly render a decision. 82  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit held that two members of a three-member 
Board may validly render a decision.83   Moreover, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that, on numerous occasions, the Board has issued a decision by 
two members where the third judge has died or taken ill.84  Therefore, the 
Photo-Sonics court suggested that, even if the resigning member had not 
participated in the decision, the decision would be valid.85 
The Photo-Sonics case, however, differs from the issue at hand for 
three reasons.  First, in Photo-Sonics, three members actually heard the 
                                                                                                             
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 123. 
 78 29 U.S.C. § 153(b). 
 79 Photo-Sonics, 678 F.2d at 122. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Photo-Sonics, 678 F.2d at 122 (citing Tobin v. Ramey 206 F.2d 505, 507 (5th Cir. 
1953)). 
 82 Photo-Sonics, 678 F.2d at 122–23. 
 83 Id. at 123. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
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case and made the decision.  Currently, two members are hearing the 
cases and issuing decisions.  Second, Photo-Sonics, like the statute, 
“answer[ed] the question of what happens when there are three members 
of the Board but one is absent or disqualified.”86  Presently, there is no 
third member.  Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Board, as a 
whole, retained its quorum of three.  Today, the Board has only two 
members on the Board, and therefore does not have the required three-
member quorum. 
III. SPLIT OF AUTHORITY 
A. Two-member NLRB may validly exercise its power under Section 3(b) 
of the NLRA. 
Five circuits have held that decisions made by the two-member 
Board are valid.87  One example is New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB.88  In 
New Process Steel, the Seventh Circuit held that the two-member Board 
had authority to hear labor disputes and to issue orders.89 
New Process Steel operated five steel processing facilities; a union 
was certified as the exclusive bargaining agent for New Process Steel’s 
employees at its Indiana facility.90  New Process Steel and the union 
began negotiations by initialing each contract provision that they 
tentatively agreed upon.91  Once the entire contract had been reviewed, 
the union wanted New Process Steel to sign the agreement.92  However, 
New Process Steel refused to sign the contract until the union had the 
employees vote for the contract.93  The union reluctantly agreed and 
made plans for the employees to ratify the contract.94  New Process Steel 
and the union never discussed any ratification procedures, so the union 
                                                                                                             
 86 Posting of Richard Bales to Workplace Prof Blog, 
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/ (December 28, 2007). 
 87 See generally, Northeastern Land Services, LTD v. NRLB, 560 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 
2009); Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB, 568 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009); Narricot Industries, 
L.P. v. NLRB, 587 F.3d 654 (4th Cir. 2009); New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 
840 (7th Cir. 2009); Teamsters Local Union No. 523 v. NLRB, Nos. 08-9568, 08-9577, 
2009 WL 4912300 (10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2009). 
 88 New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 89 Id. at 848. 
 90 New Process Steel, LP, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 185 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1160, at *3 
(2008), enforced by 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 New Process Steel, LP, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 185 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1160, at *4 
(2008), enforced by 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
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used its traditional procedure. 95   The ratification process was 
accomplished by first voting for or against the contract. 96   If the 
employees voted against the contract, “but then did not vote to strike by 
2/3 majority,” the contract was ratified by the union.97 
The New Process Steel employees neither voted for the contract nor 
voted to strike; accordingly, the union ratified the contract. 98   New 
Process Steel objected, contending that the contract was never ratified; 
therefore, the tentative contract was rendered void. 99   The union 
challenged New Process Steel’s contention, arguing that New Process 
Steel was committing an unfair labor practice. 100   The two-member 
Board heard the case and issued a decision in favor of the union.101  New 
Process Steel appealed to the Seventh Circuit, arguing that the two-
member Board lacked authority to issue decisions.102 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by evaluating the plain 
meaning of the statute.103  New Process argued that the Board had not 
delegated its powers to three members because the term of one of the 
members was about to expire.104  Thus, according to New Process, this 
member was a “phantom member,” and the Board essentially delegated 
its powers to two members.105  However, the Board argued that Section 
3(b) provides that the Board may delegate its authority to a three-
member panel, and that this panel may still conduct business with only 
two members.106  Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit held that the plain 
meaning of the statute provides that “a vacancy of one member of a three 
member panel does not impede the right of the remaining two members 
to execute the full delegated powers of the NLRB.”107 
Even though the Seventh Circuit held that the statute 
unambiguously provided for a valid two-member Board, the Court 
delved into the legislative history of the NLRA for further arguments that 
                                                                                                             
 95 Id. at *5. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 New Process Steel, LP, 353 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 185 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1160, at *5 
(2008), enforced by, 564 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 99 Id. at *6. 
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its decision was correct. 108   The Seventh Circuit observed that the 
purpose of the Taft-Hartley Amendments was two-fold: to improve 
quality and to improve efficiency.109  Additionally, the Seventh Circuit 
found “no suggestion . . . [in the legislative history] that the Board is 
restricted from acting when its membership falls below a certain 
level.” 110   Instead, if the two-member Board were held invalid, the 
Board’s operations would come to a halt and frustrate Congress’s goal of 
increasing efficiency. 111   Therefore, the Seventh Circuit upheld the 
validity of the two-member Board based on the plain meaning of the 
statute as well as its legislative history. 
The Second Circuit, in Snell Island SNF LLC v. NLRB,112 provided 
a different rationale for validating the two-member Board.  In Snell 
Island, the Second Circuit held that the two-member Board retained its 
jurisdiction even though the Board had lost its quorum, and therefore the 
decision of the two-member Board was valid.113 
Snell Island was a nursing home that provided long-term health 
care to elderly and disabled adults.114  An election was held to make the 
union the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of all Snell 
Island employees.115  The union won the election, and the Board certified 
the union.116  Soon after, the union requested that Snell Island recognize 
and bargain with the union on behalf of the employees.117  Snell Island 
refused to bargain with the union, claiming as an affirmative defense that 
the union’s certification was not valid.118  The union moved for summary 
judgment, and the Board granted it because Snell Island had failed to 
challenge the union’s certification at the prior representation hearing.119 
Snell Island sought review of the Board’s judgment that Snell 
Island had violated the NLRA by not recognizing and bargaining with 
the unionized employees.120  On appeal, Snell Island did not challenge 
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the Board’s decision on the merits.121  Instead, Snell Island contended 
that a judgment by a two-member Board violated the NLRA, and 
therefore the decision was invalid.122 
On review, the Second Circuit applied the Chevron doctrine to 
interpret the language of the NLRA.123  The Chevron doctrine provides a 
two-step process for analyzing statutes that govern federal agencies.124  
The first step is to decide whether Congress has addressed the issue.125   
If the statutory text is unambiguous and speaks to the issue, then 
Congress has addressed the issue, and there is no need for further 
analysis.126  However, if the statutory text is ambiguous, then the court 
must use the canons of construction and legislative history of the statute 
to identify Congress’ intent. 127   If Congress’s intent may not be 
determined, then the court must “defer to an agency’s interpretation of 
the statute it administers, so long as it is reasonable.”128 
Thus, in accordance with the Chevron doctrine, the Snell Island 
court first turned to the statutory text on point to see if it illuminated 
Congress’s intent.129  The court focused on Section 3(b), which states 
that “three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum 
of the Board, except that two members shall constitute a quorum of any 
group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof.”130  
Although the Seventh Circuit had held that this text was sufficiently 
clear to answer whether a two-member Board was valid, the Second 
Circuit did not find that the statute was unambiguous on its face.131  The 
fact that there was a circuit split on the issue was itself sufficient proof 
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for the Snell Island court to hold that the section 3(b) text was 
ambiguous.132 
In accordance with the Chevron doctrine, the Second Circuit next 
turned to the legislative history of the NLRA and to pertinent canons of 
construction to determine whether Congress intended for a two-member 
Board to retain jurisdiction.133  The court first analyzed the legislative 
history of the NLRA as described by the parties.134  The Board noted that, 
in 1947, the NLRA expanded the Board from three members to five 
members; this increase in membership was supposed to enable the Board 
to hear “twice as” many cases as it had in the past.135  Achieving a more 
efficient Board was essential at the time because the Board was behind in 
its work, and the amendments to the NLRA put a greater burden on the 
Board.136 
After discussing the statute’s legislative history, the Board argued 
that prior to the 1947 Taft-Hartley Amendments, only two members were 
required for a quorum, and, “during its 12 years of administering federal 
labor policy, [the Board] issued hundreds of decisions with only two of 
its three seats filled.”137  However, while the Snell Island court conceded 
that such history seemed to support the Board’s reading of the statute, the 
court held that the legislative history did not “definitively answer the 
precise question at issue”; that is, whether Congress would validate or 
invalidate the two-member Board under the current NLRA.138 
Therefore, the court deferred to the argument of the NLRB.139  The 
Board, relying on the OLC opinion, had held that the statute allowed for 
two members to constitute a quorum for a three-member panel based on 
both the plain text of the statute and its legislative history.  Despite its 
deference to the Board, the Snell Island court noted that the statute does 
not answer whether a panel retains jurisdiction when the NLRB loses its 
quorum; consequently, the Snell Island court observed that the D.C. 
Circuit’s opposing view is reasonable as well.140  But according to the 
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Chevron doctrine, the court must give deference to the agency’s opinion 
if it is reasonable.141 
Thus, the Second Circuit held that, because of the two-member 
quorum, the three-member “panel continued to operate in accordance 
with section 3(b) of the Act after one of its members ceased to serve on 
the Board and even though the Board itself lost a quorum.”142   The 
Second Circuit’s analysis provided a detailed and reasonable argument 
for the defense of the two-member Board, using the Chevron analysis. 
Moreover, the Second Circuit’s decision to uphold the validity of the 
two-member Board “ma[de] the chance for Supreme Court review even 
higher” because the decision made the tally three to one in favor of 
upholding the two-member Board.143 
Another circuit that has held in favor of the two-member Board is 
the First Circuit, in Northeastern Land Services, Ltd. v. NLRB.144   The 
First Circuit held that the designation of power to a three-member Board 
allowed for the current two-member Board to represent a quorum by the 
“plain text” of the statute.145  Section 3(b) permits the Board to delegate 
its power to a three-member panel, just as the current Board did.146  
Additionally, the First Circuit noted that the statute plainly authorized the 
Board to continue adjudicating despite a vacancy.147  The First Circuit 
observed that it was a vacancy which left the two member quorum 
remaining, and that the statute provides that a vacancy “shall not . . . 
impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of the powers 
of the Board.”148  The First Circuit further noted that its decision was 
consistent with the Office of Legal Counsel opinion; the Board had relied 
on this opinion when deciding how to deal with the pending vacancies.149  
Therefore, the two-member Board had jurisdiction to hear cases and to 
issue decisions. 
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B. Two-member NLRB lacks the power to issue decisions under Section 
3(b) of the NLRA. 
Only one court, the D.C. Circuit, has found that a two-member 
Board is invalid.150  In Laurel Baye Healthcare of Lake Lanier, Inc. v. 
NLRB, the D.C. Circuit held that the current two-member Board was not 
“properly constituted,” and, thus, the decisions rendered by it were not 
valid.151 
The case involved a company, Laurel Baye Healthcare, that 
provided skilled care nursing services to people in Buford, Georgia.152  
Employees of Laurel Baye Healthcare elected a union, and the Board 
certified the union some time later.153  Subsequently, Laurel Baye made 
unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of the employees’ 
contracts, including a new dress code, a new attendance policy, a new 
health insurance plan carriers and benefits, a reduction in vacation pay 
benefits, and a change in vacation notice requirements.154  Furthermore, 
Laurel Baye neither recognized nor bargained with the union after the 
union’s certification.155 
The union filed unfair labor charges against Laurel Baye, and the 
Board ordered that Laurel Baye cease and desist such practices, and 
rescind the unilateral changes Laurel Baye made to the terms and 
conditions of employment.156  Laurel Baye appealed the Board’s findings, 
giving two reasons why the two-member Board’s findings should be 
invalid: first, the Board may not delegate its power to a three member 
group if it knows that the group will soon only consist of two members; 
and, second, the Board may no longer issue decisions because it has not 
met the quorum number for the Board itself. 157   The D.C. Circuit 
disregarded Laurel Baye’s first argument because it found the second 
argument persuasive.158 
Instead of relying on the Chevron doctrine, the D.C. Circuit turned 
to a “cardinal principle of interpretation [which] requires a court to 
construe a statute ‘so that no provision is rendered inoperative or 
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superfluous, void or insignificant.’”159  If the two-member Board is valid, 
the court held, then two portions of the statute would be rendered void.160  
First, the requirement that the Board have a quorum of three “at all 
times” would be meaningless. 161   In the current situation, the Board 
quorum is not met.  Second, the distinction between the Board quorum 
and a quorum of a three-member panel would become void.162  The fact 
that two members constitute a quorum for any group of three “does not 
eliminate the requirement that a quorum of the Board is three members.  
Rather, it states only that the quorum of any three-member delegee group 
shall be two.”163 
The Laurel Baye court then pointed to principles of agency and 
corporation law to undermine the finding that the two-member Board 
was valid.164  When a principal delegates powers to an agent, the agent’s 
authority ends when the principal’s powers terminate.165 Similarly, when 
a “board’s membership falls below a quorum,” the board loses its 
powers.166  The delegated committee does not act of its own accord; like 
an agent, its powers only stem from a principal.167  The Board countered 
that the D.C. Circuit had previously allowed for other agencies to 
continue operating despite the agencies not meeting the minimum 
membership requirement.168   However, the D.C. Circuit distinguished 
these cases because the agencies that were allowed to continue despite 
their lack of members were not “‘engaged in substantive adjudications 
[concerning] unfair labor practices [and] enforc[ing] individual 
rights….’”169  The same principle, the D.C. Circuit reasoned, should not 
be extended to agencies like the National Labor Relations Board that are 
involved in such substantive adjudications.170 
Accordingly, the Laurel Baye court held that “[a] three-member 
Board may delegate its powers to a three-member group, and this delegee 
group may act with two members so long as the Board quorum 
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requirement is, ‘at all times,’ satisfied.”171  The D.C. Circuit stands alone 
in its holding, but it is important to note that the D.C. Circuit has a strong 
relationship with the Board.  Not only does the D.C. Circuit have 
jurisdiction over any NLRB decision, but also “its holding generally 
garners far more respect than those of other circuits” on labor matters.172 
Because of this strong connection with the D.C. Circuit, the decisions of 
the circuit courts are not treated equally.173 
However, in its conclusion, the D.C. Circuit acknowledged the 
inconvenience that its decision would bring to the operation of the Board 
and the resolution of labor disputes.  In response, the D.C. Circuit offered 
a practical solution to the inconvenience that its holding would inevitably 
bring.174  The D.C. Circuit suggested that, once the Board is properly 
constituted, the past decisions of the two-member Board should be 
ratified or reinstated.175  While this would not completely mitigate the 
inconvenience of the D.C. Circuit’s holding, it would provide an efficient 
means to give force to the 300-plus cases rendered invalid. 
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL 
A. Arguments Defending the Two-Member Board 
There are four arguments for holding the two-member Board valid.  
The first argument is a purely instrumental one—that holding such a 
Board invalid would require the voiding of more than 300 Board 
decisions issued over the last two-plus years.  This argument, though 
perhaps not stated so explicitly in the circuit court opinions upholding 
the two-member Board, may well have motivated those opinions.  This is 
an exceptionally poor legal argument, however, for upholding the two-
member Board, for two reasons.  First, such instrumental concerns 
cannot trump the plain language of the statute which, as will be discussed 
in more detail in the next section, permits decisions of two members of 
the Board only when those two members are part of a quorum of three.  
Second, the instrumental concerns are not insurmountable.  As discussed 
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above, the decisions issued between January 1, 2008 and the appointment 
of new Board members sufficient to create a quorum of at least three 
may be reinstated by that three-member quorum. 
The second argument for upholding the two-member Board is 
closely related to the instrumental argument.  This second argument is 
that allowing the two-member Board to continue adjudication and 
upholding its previous decisions is arguably consistent with the 
legislative history of the statute.176  The drafters of the Taft-Hartley Act 
sought to make the Board more efficient by increasing the membership 
of the Board from three to five.177  In this way, the Board would be able 
to hear more cases and render more decisions in a smaller time frame.  
However, if the Supreme Court decides that the Board may no longer 
adjudicate, then the decision will halt the Board’s work altogether.  Any 
Board adjudications will have to be deferred until additional members 
are appointed by the President and approved by the Senate.  Moreover, if 
the two-member Board is invalidated, one and a half years of Board 
decisions will be erased.178  Therefore, invalidating the Board will be 
anything but efficient. 
Additionally, the legislative history illustrates that at least one 
senator, Senator Joseph C. O’Mahoney, who had opposed the Taft-
Hartley Act, disliked the idea of delegating the Board’s powers “to less 
than a quorum of the Board.”179  Although this demonstrates that the 
senator opposed two members deciding cases, it also may be used to 
demonstrate that the statute allows for “less than a quorum of the Board” 
to hear cases—and this is why he adamantly opposed the Taft-Hartley 
Amendments. 
Nonetheless, the legislative history does not clearly prove that 
Congress intended a two-member Board to adjudicate.  Even if the 
Supreme Court allows the Board to continue operating, the efficiency 
that the Taft-Hartley Act sought will not be achieved with only two 
members.  Even while operating, the Board has (admirably) decided to 
leave the particularly difficult cases for a day when the Board is fully 
constituted.180  Thus, whether the Board is operating or not, the goal of 
efficiency is significantly diminished when there are only two members. 
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Furthermore, although Senator O’Mahoney rightly expressed 
anxiety at the idea of delegating the Board’s powers to less than a 
quorum of the Board, his words, like the other legislative history, fail to 
prove that the Board was meant to operate with two members. 
O’Mahoney was most likely worried about two members adjudicating 
cases in general, not two members constituting the entire Board.  In any 
event, he was only one senator, and was on the losing side of the Taft-
Hartley Amendments. 
The third argument for holding the two-member Board valid is that 
the history of the NLRA itself supports a holding that a two-member 
Board is valid.181  As noted above, prior to the Taft Hartley amendments, 
the Board consisted of three members, two of which formed a quorum.182  
In addition, the prior law had a “vacancy clause” similar to the current 
one, which provided that “‘[a] vacancy . . . shall not impair the right of 
the remaining members to exercise all the powers of the Board, and two 
members shall, at all times, constitute a quorum.’”183  Because of this 
vacancy clause, between the years of 1935 and 1947, the Board issued 
hundreds of decisions with only two members.184  Proponents of the two-
member Board reason that, because the 1947 amendments “left 
undisturbed the two-member quorum requirement for panels of the 
Board,” the Board should be allowed to adjudicate with two members as 
it had under the prior law.185 
Despite the fact that there is still a vacancy clause, this argument 
remains unpersuasive.  Although the Board did previously render 
decisions with only two members, these decisions occurred before the 
1947 Taft-Hartley amendments.  The 1947 amendments altered the last 
portion of the vacancy clause, requiring three members to constitute a 
quorum of the Board and two members to constitute a quorum of a panel 
of the Board.  Using this argument ignores the 1947 amendments.   Prior 
to 1947, a fully constituted Board consisted of only three members, so it 
is not surprising that a quorum would consist of two.  After 1947, 
however, a fully constituted Board consisted of five members.  A 
quorum of a five-member Board normally would be three; a quorum of 
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two would be aberrational, and there is nothing in the legislative history 
of the Taft-Hartley amendments suggesting that Congress intended such 
an aberrational result. 
The fourth argument for upholding the two-member Board is 
Chevron deference.  The Chevron doctrine requires that a court first 
determine if Congress has expressly addressed the issue at hand.186  If, 
after analyzing the statute, the Court finds that Congress was silent on 
the issue, “the question is . . . whether the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.”187  The Court may not decide the 
issue if the agency’s answer is based on a reasonable interpretation of the 
statute.188  Accordingly, the Chevron doctrine has been used by courts to 
determine that the two-member Board is invalid.189  If a deciding court 
determines that the statute is ambiguous on whether a two-member 
Board may continue to issue decisions, it may simply turn to the NLRB’s 
position that a two-member Board is valid.190 
However, there are three reasons why the Chevron deference 
doctrine does not apply here.  First, the OGC opinion does not constitute 
a decision of the administrative agency.  Specifically, the Chevron 
doctrine does not apply because the Board has not spoken on the issue. In 
the Snell Island brief, the appellant contended that the Second Circuit 
committed grievous error by deferring, not to the Board’s interpretation, 
but to the OLC’s opinion.191  The appellant noted that: 
The Board did not undertake to make, formally or 
otherwise, its own independent determination as to 
the meaning of Section 3(b). This issue was never 
litigated in any formal Board proceeding, nor did the 
Board engage in formal rulemaking. Instead, the 
Board sought an opinion from the OLC and the Board 
agreed to be “bound” by that determination. Thus, it is 
the opinion of the OLC, not the [B]oard, to which the 
Second Circuit deferred.192 
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Rather than pronouncing with definitiveness its own ruling on the 
issue, the Board (commendably) went on to request certiorari.193  The 
Board’s own reluctance to assert an opinion and stick to it demonstrates 
that even the Board itself has reason to doubt whether Congress 
implicitly delegated power to interpret this section of the statute.194 
Professor Ronald Turner of the University of Houston concurs, 
noting that “the OLC’s view . . . [does not reflect] the Board’s expertise, 
informed judgment, and articulated and persuasive reasoning and 
explanation.”195  Therefore, the OLC opinion “is not and should in no 
way be equated” with the opinion of the Board, i.e. the agency at issue.196 
Mr. Turner’s argument against applying the Chevron doctrine stops 
here.197 
Second, the conclusion of the OGC opinion is not reasonable 
because it is inconsistent with the explicit language of the statute.  
Chevron deference applies only when there is statutory ambiguity or a 
gap; none exists here.198 
Third, Chevron deference does not apply when an agency is 
arguable expanding its jurisdiction beyond statutory boundaries.  Courts 
should give particular scrutiny to the decisions of administrative agencies 
that expand the scope of agency jurisdiction. 199   In such cases, the 
Chevron doctrine, which the Second Circuit used to hold that the two-
member Board was valid, does not apply. 200   The Chevron doctrine 
provides for deference to an agency because it assumes that statutory 
ambiguity is an implied delegation of Congress to the agency “to fill in 
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the statutory gaps.”201  However, “in extraordinary cases – such as in an 
agency’s interpretation of the scope of its jurisdiction – there may be 
reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress intended such an 
implicit delegation.”202  In the situation at hand, the Board is defending 
its jurisdiction or power to hear cases.203  Although it is important for the 
Board to continue adjudication, it is also important for Congress to 
confine the Board’s powers to those given it by Congress.  An 
interpretation of the NLRA giving the Board power even when its 
membership falls below the quorum is an interpretation that deserves 
further examination; that is, examination beyond deference to the 
Board’s pronouncement on the issue. 
A. Arguments for Invalidating the Two-Member Board 
Although the decision to invalidate the two-member Board would 
bring labor adjudications to a halt, there are three powerful reasons to 
invalidate the two-member Board.  First, the two-member Board 
contravenes the explicit language of the statute; invalidating the two-
member Board would uphold the statutory integrity of the NLRA.204  As 
the D.C. Circuit pointed out in Laurel Baye, permitting the two-member 
Board to continue would render certain provisions in Section 3 of the 
NLRA void.205  The statute specifies that three members constitute the 
quorum of the Board “at all times.”206  However, two members constitute 
a quorum of any group of three or more members to which the Board 
delegates its powers.207  Specifically, the drafters of the NLRA wrote that 
two members were a quorum “of any group designated pursuant to the 
first sentence hereof.”208  If the drafters had intended the quorum of the 
Board to fall below three, the statute would not have required the Board 
quorum to be three “at all times.”209  Moreover, the two-member quorum 
provision would not state that the quorum was of any group designated 
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by the Board, instead of the Board itself.210  Therefore, if the Supreme 
Court were to hold that the two-member Board is valid, these provisions 
would become meaningless.211  If such an interpretation would render 
parts of the text insignificant, then it is not a reasonable interpretation of 
the text. In fact, it is contrary to the plain language of the NLRA. 
Second, invalidating the two-member Board would protect against 
abuse of the Board’s power in deciding labor disputes and individual 
rights.  Currently, the fate of all labor disputes rests in the hands of two 
Board members.  Congress created the NLRA because labor-employer 
disputes threatened to bring the nation’s commercial activity to a halt.212 
Congress then established the Board with certain requirements to ensure 
that proper authorities handled these disputes.  Although the statute does 
allow for a two-member quorum of a group designated by the Board to 
adjudicate, the Act was not intended to allow for a two-member Board, 
as a whole, to adjudicate all cases.213  Such a situation may lead to abuses 
in power that the D.C. Circuit cautioned against in Railroad Yardmasters 
of America v. Harris.214 
In Yardmasters, the D.C. Circuit held that “a single member of the 
National Mediation Board [“NMB”] may act for the Board pursuant to a 
validly issued delegation order that is narrowly tailored to prevent the 
temporary occurrence of two vacancies from completely disabling the 
Board.”215  The statute establishing the NMB required that “[t]wo of the 
members in office shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of the 
business of the Board.”216  During the time that the NMB consisted of 
one member, a representation dispute arose between two unions vying 
for representation of employees at the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company. 217   The Railroad Yardmasters of America (RYA) had 
represented the Company’s employees from 1935 to 1982. 218   The 
Yardmasters Steering Committee (YSC) filed an application with the 
NMB to decide whether the Yardmaster employees wished to have YSC 
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replace RYA. 219   The unions held the elections by secret ballot. 220 
However, before the ballots were counted, RYA filed letters of protest 
with the Board, claiming that YSC had interfered with RYA’s election 
campaign and that the election failed to comply with requirements.221  
The protests were denied by the one-member NMB, and RYA appealed 
the decision, contending that one member did not constitute a valid 
quorum, and that the decision therefore was invalid.222 
The majority of the D.C. Circuit upheld the one-member NMB. 
However, the dissent cautioned against the majority holding, noting that 
enabling the Board to keep conducting business when its membership 
fell below the quorum could lead to an abuse of power.223  The majority, 
addressing this argument, noted that such an abuse of power was not 
possible because the NMB was not engaged in “substantive 
adjudications.”.224   The responsibilities of the NMB were to mediate 
contract disputes, to resolve representation disputes, and to administer 
arrangements for arbitrating disputes.225  So, unlike the NLRB, the NMB 
“does not adjudicate unfair labor practices or seek to enforce individual 
rights under the Act.” 226   When a Board has the power to decide 
individual rights and labor disputes, the risk of abuse of power is great, 
and should be guarded against no matter how inconvenient the result. 
Finally, holding the two-member Board invalid may provide 
incentive for new members of the Board to be appointed and confirmed. 
If the operations of the Board come to a “grinding halt” as feared, it may 
be the necessary impetus for President Obama and Congress to agree on 
new members.  Once new members are agreed upon, the Board may 
continue to adjudicate without apprehension that its decisions will be 
invalidated for lack of a quorum. 
C. Proposal 
The main problem with invalidating the two-member Board is that 
the decisions of labor disputes would temporarily come to a halt.  
Although this would be “inconvenient and unfortunate,” a court should 
not circumvent a statutory framework in order to avoid such 
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inconvenience.227  The function of a court is to “interpret the statutory 
scheme as it exists, not as . . . [it] wish[es] it to be.”228 
As the D.C. Circuit suggested, the answer to this may be to have 
new members ratify past decisions of the two-member Board.  Former 
Board Chairman Robert Battista explained this suggestion, surmising 
that the court was simply inviting “[t]he new member[s] . . . to go 
through those cases [decided by a two-member Board] and see if he [or 
they] agree[ ].” 229   Although this suggestion does not completely 
eliminate the inconvenience of having an invalid Board, it does mitigate 
some of the problems associated with having an invalid Board.  Having 
one of the new members review the decisions would save time and still 
allow the statute to remain intact. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The two-member Board has wreaked havoc on the stability of labor 
law.  With two members constituting the entire Board, the decisions of 
more than 300 cases are suspect.  While five circuits have actually 
upheld the two-member Board and its decisions,230 the D.C. Circuit has 
struck down the 300 cases and enjoined the Board from continuing to 
adjudicate.231  Although the two-member Board continues to adjudicate, 
every step is now cast in legal doubt; accordingly, the Board has 
petitioned the Supreme Court to review the issue.232  The Supreme Court 
has granted review.233 
While the ultimate decision will be up to the Supreme Court, the 
above analysis demonstrates that invalidating the two-member Board 
garners the most legal support.  Nonetheless, invalidating the two-
member Board will bring the work of the Board to a temporary halt.  
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While this scenario is undesirable, it is also undesirable to attach power 
to the Board which is not supported by statute.  To mitigate the 
inconvenience of invalidating the two-member Board, the D.C. Circuit 
proposed that the new members should review the cases decided by the 
two-member Board in order to validate them.  While this process is 
indeed cumbersome, it seems the most practical solution to the situation 
at hand. 
